Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting attacks for weak laser pulse implementations
| Authors: | V Scarani, A Acin, G Ribordy, N Gisin |
| Journal: | Physical Review Letters 92, 057901 (2004) |
| DOI: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.92.057901 |
| Abstract: | We introduce a new class of quantum key distribution protocols, tailored to be robust against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. We study one of these protocols, which differs from the original protocol by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) only in the classical sifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than BB84 against PNS attacks at zero error. |
| File: | prl57901.pdf |
BibTeX Source
@Article{Scarani2004,
author = "V. Scarani and A. Acin and G. Ribordy and N. Gisin",
title = "Quantum cryptography protocols robust against photon number splitting attacks for
weak laser pulse implementations",
journal = "Physical Review Letters",
year = "2004",
volume = "92",
pages = "057901",
number = "5",
abstract = "We introduce a new class of quantum key distribution protocols, tailored to be
robust against photon number splitting (PNS) attacks. We study one of these
protocols, which differs from the original protocol by Bennett and Brassard (BB84)
only in the classical sifting procedure. This protocol is provably better than BB84
against PNS attacks at zero error.",
doi = "10.1103/PhysRevLett.92.057901",
owner = "cc",
sn = "0031-9007",
timestamp = "2010.08.20",
ut = "WOS:000188785200058",
}